King ’s Academy
The First World War was an unprecedented catastrophe that shaped our advanced world . Erik Sass is hatch the events of the war precisely 100 years after they happened . This is the 133rd installment in the series .
July 25-26, 1914: Austria-Hungary Rejects Serbia’s Response
Thedeliveryof Austria - Hungary ’s ultimatum to Serbia on July 23 , 1914 touch off mad activity across Europe as workforce of body politic sample to defuse the office by bugger off Austria - Hungary to extend the deadline or soften the terms . But in the end their uncoordinated efforts were too short , too previous — and it did n’t help that some of them were place mixed message .
Wrong Impressions
In the final hours before the Serbian answer was received at 6 pm on July 25 , Austria - Hungary and Germany examine to sway Europe ’s other Great Powers not to get imply . Above all they hoped that France and Britain , which had no unmediated interest in Serbia , would urge moderation on Russia — and at first it looked like they might get their compliments .
In Paris the text of the Austro - Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Justice Minister Jean - Baptiste Bienvenu - Martin , filling in for Premier ( and Foreign Minister ) René Viviani , who was still at sea with President Raymond Poincaré on the return journeying from St. Petersburg . According to the Austro - Magyar embassador to Paris , Count Szécsen , Bienvenu - Martin seemed to understand the need for abrasive measures , and the German embassador , Wilhelm von Schoen , made a similar report , leading German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow to conclude that “ France , too , hope a localisation of function of the struggle . ”
Meanwhile , in London , British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey still refused to take English . On July 25 , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov instructed Russia ’s ambassador to London , Alexander Benckendorff , to point out that
That same day , Grey ’s own assistant undersecretary of state for foreign affair , Eyre Crowe , argued that Germany ’s attitude would determine the outcome , and that London should therefore admonish Berlin before it was too late : “ The point that now matter is whether Germany is or is not absolutely compulsive to have this state of war now . There is still the chance that she can be made to hesitate , if she can be induce to grasp that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia . ”
But Grey was loth to make even blot out threats to Berlin and Vienna , hoping alternatively to proffer Britain ’s services as an impartial mediator between Austria - Hungary and Russia — obviously still failing to comprehend that Austria - Hungary was set on warfare with Serbia no matter what . He also continued to suggest that Germany join the other Great Powers in mediating the contravention , for illustration telling the German embassador , Prince Lichnowsky , Berlin could “ determine the Austrian government to take a well-disposed view ” of the Serbian response — again failing to infer that Germany was actually advance Austria - Hungary to spurn via media and squash Serbia .
The Germans and Austrians took French and British ambiguity as grounds that neither would add up to Russia ’s aid , which in turn made it unconvincing that Russia herself would in reality struggle when the crisp were down . Thus on the evening of July 25 Chancellor Bethmann - Hollweg air a wire to Kaiser Wilhelm II ( still enjoy a cruise in the Norse fiord on the royal yacht ) insure him that “ Paris and London are actively working for localization of the conflict . ”
Victims of Their Own Deceit
But this was a black misapprehension , as outcome would shortly reveal . First of all , as curate of DoJ , Bienvenu - Martin had no experience or authorisation over Gallic foreign insurance policy , and the Germans should never have imagined that his casual remark actually represented the views of the Gallic governance — a fact he accent himself .
Second , when it came to Britain the Germans were ironically falling victim to their own trickery . Lichnowsky was under instructions to say that Germany had not been confer with by Austria - Hungary about the latter ’s plans regarding Serbia . Foreign Secretary Grey took this lie at cheek value and assumed that Germany also want to keep the repose , which is why he did n’t threaten Berlin — but if he had known that Germany was secretly encouraging Austria - Hungary , he in all probability would have .
As a issue of fact , the German deception went even further than that : when Grey expect Berlin to urge Vienna to assume outside intermediation of the contravention with Serbia , the Germans said they would commend the idea to their ally — but actually told the Austrians to ignore the British hypnotism and proceed with their plan .
The Serbian Response
Meanwhile , as the hours grovel by on July 25 and the deadline approached , Serbian leader worked feverishly to craft a lowly response that would meet as many of the Austrian demands as possible , but without sacrifice Serbia ’s sovereignty . Ultimately , the Serbians match to nine out of eleven conditions , include issuing an prescribed financial statement disavowing subversion aspire against Austria - Hungary ; crushing of publications inciting hatred of Austria - Hungary ; dissipation of “ Narodna Obrana , ” a Yugoslavian propaganda organization ; elimination of anti - Hapsburg content from textbooks and teaching ; remotion from armed service of all United States Army policeman who embrace anti - Austrian propaganda ; arrest of Ciganović and Tankosić , bothimplicatedin the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ; suppression of cross - border smuggling between Serbia and Bosnia ; and explanation of anti - Austrian statements by high - order Serbian official .
But two demands remained unfulfilled : token five , for the involution of voice from the Austro - Hungarian government in the suppression of seditious moments , and particular six , participation of Austro - Hungarian officials in the internal Serbian judicial investigating . Both weather condition would have undermine Serbian sovereignty , forget the Serbian government no pick but to deliver the following fateful reply : “ As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro - Hungarian agent … this can not be accepted , as this is a violation of the organization and of criminal function . ”
Chronicling America
As expected , the Serbian refusal on these two points supply Austria - Hungary the pretence it needed to expose off diplomatic relations in preparation for warfare . After find the Serbian response at 6 pm the Austro - Magyar ambassador to Belgrade , Baron von Giesl , notified Vienna , burn his codebooks , sent a note to Prime Minister Pašić declaring that diplomatical relation were kick downstairs off , and straight off manoeuvre to the Belgrade wagon train station , where he board the next train for Austria - Hungary at 6:40pm .
After receive tidings of the Serbian response at 7:45pm , around 9 pm Emperor Franz Josef ordered mobilization against Serbia under “ Plan B ” ( for “ Balkans ” ) , which called for the formation of three armies along the Serbian frontier — the 2d , Fifth , and Sixth ( see map below)—while three others guard Austria - Hungary ’s border with Russia . On the other side Serbia ’s Prince Regent Alexander had already decree mobilization that good afternoon , and the Serbian authorities began evacuating Belgrade — just a few miles from Austro - Hungarian territory across the Danube River — and relocating to Kragujevac , about 50 naut mi to the south . In the opening weeks of the warfare the Serbian First , Second , and Third Armies would form north and west of Kragujevac before advancing to the Austro - Hungarian frontier ( top ) .
On the evening of July 25 enthusiastic crowd gathered in Berlin and Vienna , cheer up the rejection of the Serbian response . The British embassador to Vienna , Sir Maurice de Bunsen , later recalled : “ The demeanor of the people at Vienna and , as I was inform , in many other main cities of the Monarchy , showed apparently the popularity of the theme of state of war with Serbia … Now the floodgates were opened , and the entire hoi polloi and jam clamoured impatiently for immediate … penalisation of the hate Serbian wash . ”
Russia Prepares to marshal
At the same metre Russia was preparing to mobilize in support of Serbia , marking a dangerous escalation of the situation . On the break of day of July 25 , before Serbia even presented its response to the Austrian ultimatum , Tsar Nicholas II ordered “ pre - mobilization ” measures let in the return of troops on maneuvers , automatic forwarding of all cadet ship’s officer to full officers , and call - up of reservists for frontier variance . The Tsar also approved—“in principle”—mobilization against Austria - Hungary , involving 13 army corps check a total 1.1 million men ; however the actual order for mobilization was n’t yet given .
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov hoped that a show of intensity would suffice to deter Austria - Hungary from lash out Serbia , and also believed that a “ fond mobilization , ” bound to the Russian frontier with Austria - Hungary , could convey this substance without threatening Germany . However he failed to make two primal details .
First of all , the pre - mobilization rules of order actually bear on all Russian forces along both the German and Austro - Magyar border — and the Germans were unlikely to hold on , or care about , the fine distinctions between pre - militarisation and mobilization . Indeed , it was all a thing of semantics , and the preparations certainly face warlike to the French embassador to St. Petersburg , Maurice Paléologue , who tell the Italian ambassador on the evening of July 25 that the Tsar ’s “ Council of Ministers has fill decisions on the … measures to be put in force in the state of war against Austria and Germany , now regarded as imminent . ” Later Paléologue accompanied Izvolsky , the Russian embassador to France ( now speed back to his Wiley Post ) to the train place , where , amid crowds of soldier , they consort , “ It is state of war this clock time . ”
secondly — and even more disastrously — there was no such affair as “ fond mobilisation ” against Austria - Hungary : the Russian ecumenical stave had only reap upplansfor general mobilization against both Germany and Austria - Hungary , on the reasonable August 15 the allies would agitate together . In other Word , it was all or nothing , and when the Tsar ’s ministers find this inauspicious fact , they would present a terrible choice : back down and lease Austria - Hungary crush Serbia , or proceed to general mobilization .
More Misstatements
As the sun rose on July 26 , 1914 , the site in Europe was rapidly birl out of control , but no one had declared war and swift , emphatic diplomatic negotiations might yet have saved the Clarence Shepard Day Jr. . regrettably , now it was Sazonov ’s turn to misspeak . Still hoping to defuse the place , the Russian foreign minister assured the German embassador , Friedrich Pourtalès , that “ no militarisation order had been issued … [ and ] the Cabinet had decide not to come out one until Austria - Hungary take over a hostile attitude toward Russia”—for some intellect leaving out Serbia , the focal power point of the whole conflict . It ’s knockout to translate this omission , but Sazonov may just have assume that the phrase “ toward Russia ” covered Serbia as well , since everyone understood the basic place — but in these pregnant negotiations any misapprehension could be catastrophic .
To be fair , Sazonov was in good troupe when it came to tragic misstatements . In one of the more pregnant errors , over breakfast on July 26 , Britain ’s King George V told the Kaiser ’s pal , Prince Henry of Prussia , “ We shall render all we can to keep out of this and shall continue achromatic . ” While it ’s easy to see how the Germans might interpret this in an encouraging light , as with Bienvenu - Martin ’s argument they never should have given so much weight to the impression of a single somebody , especially as the British monarch no longer exercised much real control over alien policy ; the business leader , who had not consulted extensively with Prime Minister Asquith or Foreign Secretary Grey , was expressing a personal opinion at most .
In any event , the Germans often cut down quarry to irrational optimism . For case , on July 24 , First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and Lord Chancellor Richard Haldane had dinner with Albert Ballin , a German transport magnate and skinny ally of the Kaiser , who was evidently acting as an unofficial envoy from Berlin , and offered them the following strange mountain : “ Suppose we had to go to state of war with Russia and France , and reckon we defeat France and yet took nothing from her in Europe , not an inch of her territory , only some colony to indemnify us . Would that make a difference to England ’s attitude ? say we gave a warrantee beforehand ! ”
Churchill and Haldane were skeptical about this strange , unlikely proposal for a number of grounds . For one matter , there was no manner to live that Germany would keep her word of honor after defeating France and establishing control of the continent . But Ballin somehow come away with the impression that Britain might be opened to such an musical arrangement , leading to another round of urgently confused last - minute negotiations as the fateful calendar month of July 1914 drew to a close .
The Chain Reaction
Whatever the Germans — and many British — may have hoped , Britain did n’t actually have much choice about getting take in a European war , having learned the unvoiced way that she could n’t allow the continent to fall under the control of a single force , as during the imperial peak of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte . On July 26 , Crowe , the perceptive undersecretary of state for alien affairs , outline out the chain response that was about to go :
See theprevious installmentorall entrance .
